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The objective of this research is to design and develop a reconfigurable string match-
ing co-processor using field-programmable gate array (FPGA) technology that is capable 
of matching thousands of complex patterns at gigabit network rates for network intrusion 
detection systems (NIDS).  The motivation for this work is to eliminate the most signifi-
cant bottleneck in current NIDS software, which is the pattern matching process.  The 
tasks involved with this research include designing efficient, high-performance hardware 
circuits for pattern matching and integrating the pattern matching co-processor with other 
NIDS components running on a network processor.  The products of this work include a 
system to translate standard intrusion detection patterns to FPGA pattern matching cir-
cuits that support all the functionality required by modern NIDS.  The system generates 
circuits efficient enough to enable the entire ruleset of a popular NIDS containing over 
1,500 patterns and 17,000 characters to fit into a single low-end FPGA chip and process 
data at an input rate of over 800 Mb/s.  The capacity and throughput both scale linearly, 
so larger and faster FPGA devices can be used to further increase performance.  The 
FPGA co-processor allows the task of pattern matching to be completely offloaded from 




1 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
1.1 Pattern Matching in Network Intrusion Detection 
Network intrusion detection is the process of analyzing data sent over a computer net-
work in order to detect the presence of any malicious or suspicious content in the data.  
The analysis may include the identification of unusual patterns in the data (anomaly-
based detection) or the recognition of specific patterns in the data (signature-based detec-
tion).  A signature-based network intrusion detection system (NIDS), also known as a 
rule-based NIDS, uses a set of signatures, or rules, which describe properties of network 
packets that indicate suspicious activity or known attacks.  The NIDS compares each 
incoming packet to each of the rules, and generates an alert when a packet exhibits all of 
the properties specified by a rule.  Some of the common properties analyzed for each 
packet include protocol, source address and port, destination address and port, data size, 
and data content. 
The NIDS of primary interest in this research, Snort, is an example of a signature-
based NIDS.  Snort is one of the most widely-deployed NIDS in use today.  Some of the 
reasons that it has become so popular are that it is free, open-source, highly configurable, 
and it has a large, well-maintained rule database, an active group of developers, and a re-
sponsive support community.  Another attraction of Snort is its rule specification lan-
guage, which is powerful but much easier to understand than that of other NIDS lan-
guages.  An example of a Snort rule is shown in Figure 1.  This rule will trigger an alert 
for an attempted buffer overflow attack on an FTP server.  The table below the rule de-
tails the properties that a packet must posses in order to match the rule.  The part of the 
rule before the parentheses is called the rule header, and the part of the rule inside the pa-
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rentheses contains the rule options.  Each of the rule options is a Boolean predicate that 
returns true or false.  The rule options form a logical conjunction, which means that all 
the predicates must evaluate to true in order for a rule match to occur. 
Typically, a rule header is quite general and will be matched by a large amount of 
normal network traffic.  The rule options are more specific and help to filter out harmless 
traffic.  Often, the most discriminating filtering is provided by the content rule option, 
which searches the data payload for the presence of specific strings.  However, simply 
checking for the existence of one or more patterns in a packet’s payload is not sufficient 
for accurate detection of attacks.  Sometimes, an alert may be generated for a packet that 
contains the patterns specified in a rule even though the packet is not part of an attack.  
For example, a web page describing how a particular attack works might be wrongly con-
sidered an active attack on a web server.  Such invalid alerts are called false positives and 
can be avoided through the use of more detailed specifications of the attack patterns.  In 
order to reduce false positives, a NIDS and its rule language should allow a rule to spec-
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 (msg:"FTP EXPLOIT 
stat overflow"; flags:A+; dsize:>1000; content:"stat "; nocase;) 
  
Protocol: TCP 
Source Address: From External Network 
Source Port: Any 
Destination Address: To Internal Network 
Destination Port: 21 (FTP) 
TCP Flags: ACK 
Data size: Greater than 1000 bytes 
Payload data contains: 
(case-insensitive match)
“stat ” 
Figure 1: Snort rule example 
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ify the position, ordering, and spacing of patterns as part of an attack’s signature.  Some 
of the necessary capabilities of a NIDS pattern matcher are listed below: 
• Find a pattern that occurs after an offset from the beginning of the packet data. 
• Find a pattern that occurs (or does not occur) within a certain number of bytes 
from the beginning of the packet data or from a specified offset. 
• Find a pattern that occurs (or does not occur) after another pattern. 
• Find a pattern that occurs (or does not occur) after another pattern within a 
certain number of bytes or after a certain number of bytes. 
The Snort rule language provides mechanisms for specifying all of the above pattern rela-
tionships, and the Snort detection engine supports their semantics. 
1.2 Pattern Matching in Software 
The task of string pattern matching occurs in many applications and has been studied 
for decades.  Over the years, new algorithms have been developed to improve the per-
formance of pattern matchers in certain situations.  In the following sections, some com-
monly used algorithms are briefly discussed and references to more detailed explanations 
are provided. 
1.2.1 Single Pattern Algorithms 
In single pattern matching algorithms, the input text is scanned looking for an occur-
rence of the target pattern.  If the application needs to check for the presence of multiple 
target patterns, the input text must be scanned once for each pattern.  The simplest of 
these algorithms, known as the naïve, or brute-force, technique, does a character-by-
character match of the pattern at each position in the input text.  The process starts with 
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the left-most characters of the text and the pattern aligned.  Characters are compared from 
left to right until a mismatch is found.  After a mismatch, the pattern is shifted right one 
position and the match process restarts with the comparison of the first pattern character 
with the second text character.  If m is the length of the pattern and n is the length of the 
input text, then the worst-case number of character comparisons in the brute-force algo-
rithm is O(mn). 
Knuth, Morris, and Platt (KMP) discovered that knowledge of the properties of the 
target pattern could be used to reduce the required number of comparisons [1].  The KMP 
algorithm is similar to the brute-force algorithm except for the way mismatches are han-
dled.  In the brute-force algorithm, the pattern is always shifted right one position after a 
character mismatch, regardless of the number of character matches that occurred before 
the mismatch.  This can lead to wasted comparisons at positions that cannot possibly re-
sult in a complete pattern match.  The KMP algorithm eliminates these unnecessary com-
parisons by using information about repeated substrings in the pattern.  The pattern is 
preprocessed to generate a look-up table that indicates how many positions the pattern 
may be shifted to the right based on the position in the pattern where a mismatch occurs.  
The preprocessing takes O(m) time, the skip table uses O(m) memory, and the worst-case 
number of character comparisons is O(n). 
Boyer and Moore (BM) observed that even more character comparisons could be 
skipped if the comparison started with the rightmost character of the pattern and pro-
ceeded from right to left [2].  Like the KMP algorithm, the BM algorithm preprocesses 
the pattern to generate a table of mismatch skip values based on pattern position.  In addi-
tion, the BM algorithm generates another table of skip values based on the value of the 
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pattern character involved in the mismatch.  This table requires an entry for each charac-
ter in the alphabet used.  The value stored in the table for each character is either the 
rightmost position of that character in the pattern, or the length of the pattern if the char-
acter does not occur in the pattern.  When a mismatch occurs, the appropriate values from 
each table are retrieved and the maximum of the two values indicates the number of char-
acter positions that the pattern may be shifted to the right before the next comparison.  
This algorithm requires O(m) memory for the first table and O(q) memory for the second 
table, where q is the size of the alphabet.  The worst case number of comparisons is O(n), 
but the expected number of comparisons is less than n and decreases as the pattern length 
increases.  A study [3] of single pattern matching algorithms has shown that the BM algo-
rithm is the quickest in all cases except for when binary alphabets or very short patterns 
are involved. 
1.2.2 Multiple Pattern Algorithms 
A multiple pattern matching algorithm searches a text string for the occurrence of any 
pattern in a set of patterns using only a single pass through the text.  The most well-
known technique of this type is the Aho-Corasick (AC) algorithm [4].  The AC algorithm 
preprocesses the set of patterns to construct a pattern matching machine based on a de-
terministic finite automaton (DFA).  The matching procedure works by reading succes-
sive characters from the input string, making state transitions based on each character, 
and producing output when a complete pattern is matched.  There are three functions in-
volved in the process: a goto function, a failure function, and an output function.  Figure 






























i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
fail(i) 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 0 3 
i output(i) 
2 {he} 
5 {she, he} 
7 {his} 
9 {hers} 
Figure 2: Aho-Corasick pattern matching machine example 
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The goto function determines if a state transition can be made based on the current 
state and the value of the input character.  If the input matches one of the characters on an 
arc leaving the current state, then the state pointed to by the arc becomes the next state.  If 
the input does not match any of the characters on the arc leaving the current state, then 
the failure function determines the next state.  The failure function causes a transition to 
another intermediate state if the current partial match represents a prefix of another pat-
tern in the set.  Otherwise, the failure function causes a transition to the initial state (0).  
The output function is consulted after each state transition to determine if the current state 
represents a pattern match.  The process continues until the end of the input text is 
reached. 
1.2.3 Intrusion Detection Algorithms 
The most computationally intensive task of a rule-based NIDS is searching each in-
coming packet’s payload for the patterns specified by each of the rules [5].  Therefore, 
the algorithm used for pattern matching has a significant effect on the overall perform-
ance of the system.  This section discusses research that has attempted to improve pattern 
matching algorithms for NIDS.  Due to the availability of the source code and the rule 
database, these studies have focused on Snort.  However, the algorithms and results pre-
sented here are applicable to other NIDS and to other network security applications. 
The baseline pattern matching algorithm used for comparison purposes is the imple-
mentation in Snort version 1.9 and earlier.  This design divides the rules in the database 
into groups based on their rule headers and stores them in a two-dimensional linked list.  
The distinct rule headers are stored as rule-tree nodes (RTNs) in a linked list.  Attached to 
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each RTN is a linked list of option tree nodes (OTNs).  An OTN contains all of the rule 
options for a single rule.  The detection process for an incoming packet works as follows: 
1. The packet’s header fields are compared to the fields of each RTN in the list.  
If no matching node is found, the analysis for the packet is complete. 
2. If a matching RTN is found, the associated list of OTNs is searched.  At each 
OTN, the rule options are evaluated sequentially.  If an option check fails, the 
search continues at the next OTN.  If all of the option checks in a given OTN 
succeed, then an alert is generated and no more rules are checked against this 
packet. 
In order to reduce the amount of pattern matching required, the ‘content’ rule options are 
always checked last for each OTN.  The Boyer-Moore algorithm (described in section 
1.2.1) is used for content pattern matching. 
Since Snort groups related rules together under the same RTN, these rules often con-
tain common substrings in their content options.  However, because Snort applies the BM 
algorithm to each OTN’s content options individually, it cannot take advantage of results 
from previous pattern matching attempts.  A frequent occurrence in the Snort rule data-
base is that many rules in an OTN list will have a common prefix in their content options.  
In these cases, a single comparison operation could potentially eliminate many rules from 
further consideration, significantly reducing the amount of pattern matching required for 
a packet that does not contain the shared prefix. 
The common prefix insight above served as the motivation for some researchers to 
develop a new pattern matching algorithm for Snort [6].  They describe the new algo-
rithm as “a Boyer-Moore-like algorithm applied to a set of keywords held in an Aho-
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Corasick-like keyword tree that overlays common prefixes of the keywords.”  They call 
the algorithm AC_BM, but the only similarity to the AC algorithm is the use of a pattern 
tree.  During initialization, one tree is generated for each RTN.  The matching process 
uses techniques similar to BM to skip character comparisons, but instead of sliding a 
single pattern across the text, AC_BM slides the whole pattern tree across the text.  
Initially, the shortest pattern in the tree is aligned with the right end of the text, and the 
tree moves left towards the beginning of the text.  Unlike BM, the character comparisons 
are performed from left to right with respect to the patterns.  Two skip tables are 
generated using modified versions of the BM heuristics called the bad character shift and 
the good prefix shift, which are demonstrated in Figure 3.  When a mismatch occurs, the 
bad character shift suggests shifting to the next occurrence in the pattern tree of the 
mismatching text character.  There are two possible cases for the good prefix shift: 
1. If a substring of the partial match occurs as a complete prefix of another pat-
tern, the shift is to the character following the prefix in that pattern. 
2. If a prefix of the partial match occurs as a suffix of another pattern, the tree is 
shifted so that the suffix is aligned with the matching characters of the text.  
This case is illustrated in Figure 3. 
To ensure that no matches are missed, the algorithm cannot skip over more characters 
than the length of the shortest pattern.  Therefore, the shift value used is the maximum of 
the values from the two heuristics if it is less than the length of the shortest pattern; oth-





Bad Character Shift: The initial comparison 
fails on the text character ‘s’, so the tree is 
shifted to the next occurrence of ‘s’ in the tree.
Good Prefix Shift: There is a prefix 
match of ‘to’ that occurs as a suffix of 
‘tomato’, so the tree is shifted to align 
suffix with the matching text. 
Figure 3: AC_BM heuristics 
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Integrating the AC_BM algorithm into Snort requires some changes to the Snort de-
tection engine.  The OTN list is sorted so that all of the rules without content options are 
before the rules with content options.  This means that the non-content rules will be 
checked before the content rules.  If none of the non-content rules match the current 
packet, then the AC_BM algorithm is invoked.  If no patterns are found, then the analysis 
is done for this packet.  Otherwise, the pattern matching will stop when the first match is 
found and the rest of the rule options in the rule corresponding to the matched pattern will 
be checked.  The implementation of AC_BM in [6] does not support case-sensitive 
matching, but states that this could be accomplished by adding a second tree to each RTN 
for the case-sensitive patterns.  Also, only one content string from each rule is included in 
the pattern tree.  If a rule has a hit from the tree matching, any additional content strings 
are checked using the standard BM algorithm. 
Due to the first-match design and rule matching order of Snort, there are some issues 
with this implementation of AC_BM.  Since standard Snort scans packets from left to 
right while AC_BM scans from right to left, the first match found by each algorithm 
might be different.  Combining strings from multiple rules into a tree causes the relative 
order of the rules to be lost, which can result in a less-precise match because AC_BM 
will choose the shortest matching pattern first.  Also, placing the more general non-
content rules first could cause some attacks to be missed.  Many of these shortcomings 
could be eliminated with a more careful implementation.  The authors state that their im-
plementation was just a proof-of-concept and that they were mostly interested in improv-
ing the pattern matching performance.   
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The experiments show that the AC_BM implementation scales better than BM as the 
number of rules is increased.  When tested with the entire Snort 1.6.3 rule database, 
AC_BM was about 18 percent faster than standard BM.  In a test with only content rules, 
the execution time for AC_BM increased about 30 percent as the number of rules was 
increased from 200 to 786, while the time for standard BM increased over 200 percent.  
However, AC_BM uses approximately three times as much memory as standard BM due 
to the storage requirements of the skip tables. 
At about the same time, another group independently studied multiple pattern search 
algorithms for Snort [5].  They did not modify the structure of the Snort rule engine and 
treated the group of patterns associated with each RTN as a separate pattern set.  Their 
experiments showed that the most efficient algorithm varies with the size of the set.  Thus, 
they advocate using a hybrid approach.  Highest performance was achieved by using the 
Boyer-Moore (with Horspool optimization) algorithm for sets of size one, a setwise 
Boyer-Moore-Horspool algorithm that they developed for sets of size two through 100, 
and the standard Aho-Corasick algorithm for sets of size greater than 100.  This hybrid 
approach yielded a 52 percent reduction in pattern matching time over the standard Snort 
algorithm (single pattern Boyer-Moore). 
1.3 Pattern Matching with Reconfigurable Hardware 
1.3.1 Introduction 
The task of searching a collection of data for a set of patterns using a single pattern 
matching algorithm involves carrying out a large number of independent computations, 
where each computation consists of searching the input data for one pattern.  The work of 
this task can be divided among multiple processing elements by assigning different com-
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putations to each processing element.  Since there are no dependences between the com-
putations, they can all be executed simultaneously, resulting in an overall speedup that is 
proportional to the number of processing elements.  When a processing element can be 
constructed out of a relatively small amount of reconfigurable logic, as is the case for a 
text pattern matcher, a single FPGA chip can be programmed to contain many thousands 
of processing elements.  Since all processing elements can work on the input data at the 
same time, the FPGA performance can be several orders of magnitude better than that of 
a general-purpose processor.  Unlike a software implementation, the FPGA’s number of 
computation cycles remains constant as the number of patterns is increased (assuming 
there are enough available logic resources to implement a processing element for each 
pattern). 
Due to the large number of applications using string pattern matching and the poten-
tial speedup offered by reconfigurable logic, there have been many pattern matching sys-
tems developed based on FPGAs.  Several of these systems have been designed for inter-
active applications in which the target patterns are not known until run-time.  The focus 
of these research projects was the development of techniques for quickly reconfiguring 
the logic based on the input patterns.  The total execution time required for one 
application instance can be expressed as the sum of its three components [7]: 
1. TM: the time required to develop specialized circuitry for the given problem 
instance and map it into an FPGA bitstream.  This is usually done on the host 
computer and is often the largest component. 
2. TR: the time required to reconfigure the FPGA.  This usually involves 
downloading the bitstream to the FPGA over some type of interconnect. 
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3. TE: The time required for the FPGA to execute the desired task on the input 
and produce output. 
Reducing TM was addressed in [8] by preprogramming the FPGAs with skeleton circuitry, 
and then using partial reconfiguration at runtime to insert word detectors into the circuit.  
Although this significantly reduced TM, its effectiveness was limited by a lengthy TR.  A 
different technique, called self-reconfiguration, was taken by [7] in order to reduce both 
TM and TR.  In this approach, all three components were performed on the FPGA device.  
First, a circuit capable of reading a problem instance and generating appropriate circuitry 
was developed and preprogrammed into the FGPA.  At runtime, a problem instance was 
placed in memory accessible to the FPGA.  Then, the FPGA circuit generator read the 
problem instance and reconfigured other parts of the device to implement the specialized 
circuits.  They were able to achieve a TM+TR time on the order of 106 faster than CAD 
tools and 103 faster than software-directed partial reconfiguration. 
A separate body of research exists for applications in which the patterns are known in 
advance rather than being provided at run-time.  In an application such as network intru-
sion detection, where the patterns change infrequently (on the order of days), TM and TR 
are less important.  Instead, the goals are to minimize TE and maximize pattern density, 
even it requires a lengthy TM to generate the circuitry.   
1.3.2 Brute-Force Approach 
The most straight-forward method to building pattern matching circuits is known as 
the brute-force approach.  The brute-force algorithm produces circuits that perform a full 
comparison of every target pattern against the input in each clock cycle.  In other words, 
no match state is saved across cycles.  The input text from a packet payload is broadcast 
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to all of the pattern matchers and shifted past the target patterns at a rate of one character 
per clock cycle.  A pattern matcher for a length m string contains an m-character shift 
register for buffering input characters, m character comparators, and a match output that 
is true when all of the comparators signal a match between the contents of the input shift 
register and the target pattern.  Once the shift register is full, the pattern matcher performs 
m parallel character comparisons per clock cycle. 
The algorithm can be generalized to process i characters per clock cycle by instantiat-
ing i copies of each pattern and shifting the content of the buffer i characters in each cy-
cle.  To properly detect all possible positions of the pattern in the input stream, each copy 
of the pattern must start at a different offset relative to the beginning of the input buffer.  
The first copy starts at offset 0 and the ith copy starts at offset i-1.  Cho, et. al. [9] imple-
mented a brute-force design that processed 4 characters (32 bits) per clock cycle.  
Sourdis, et. al. [10] increased the throughput of Cho’s design significantly through ag-
gressive pipelining, which also resulted in increased latency and lower character density. 
1.3.3 Finite Automata Approaches 
  Since some of the hardware pattern matching techniques rely on finite automata, 
their theory is briefly discussed here in the context of pattern matching.  A finite automa-
tion (FA) representation of a character string is a directed graph in which the nodes repre-
sent match states and each edge is labeled with a character that will cause the associated 
transition when matched by the input. There is one initial state labeled q and one or more 
final, or accepting, states labeled fi.  An FA processes an input string and either accepts or 
rejects it.  The string is only accepted if its characters match the labels on any path from 
the initial state to a final state.  In a nondeterministic finite automation (NFA) there is a 
16 
null character denoted by ε that matches any input.  An NFA can be converted to an 
equivalent deterministic finite automation (DFA) by eliminating all edges labeled ε and 
ensuring that all nodes have no more than one outgoing edge labeled with each character. 
On a serial processor, there is a tradeoff between the low memory usage of an NFA 
and the high processing speed of a DFA.  Constructing an NFA from a regular expression 
of length n takes O(n) time and the NFA requires O(n) memory.  The NFA processes 
each input character in O(n) time.  If the NFA is then converted to a DFA, the total con-
struction time is O(2n) and the DFA requires O(2n) memory, but it is able to process each 
character in O(1) time.  However, there are optimization techniques that significantly re-
duce the construction time and memory required for the DFA in many cases.  Therefore, 
in practice, software algorithms based on DFAs are more efficient than those based on 
NFAs.  
Sidhu and Prasanna showed that the memory-speed tradeoff can be avoided with 
FPGAs by presenting a pattern matching approach that has both low construction over-
head and optimal performance [11].  This is achieved by directly implementing the NFA 
in logic.  The NFA is constructed in O(n) time, uses O(n2) FPGA area, and can process 
one input character on every clock cycle.  The key observation is that an FPGA can easily 
implement the types of NFA transitions that the conversion to a DFA eliminates by stor-
ing the state using a one-hot-like encoding.  A state with multiple outgoing edges with the 
same label translates into connecting the output from a state flip-flop to the input of mul-
tiple state flip-flops.  This enables multiple transitions to occur in a single clock cycle and 
allows multiple active states.  The edges labeled ε in an NFA are implemented by con-
necting the input of the source flip-flop to the input of the destination flip-flop, which ef-
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fectively eliminates the source flip-flop since its output is not connected.  This simple 
transition logic makes an NFA-based matcher more efficient in hardware than a DFA-
based matcher.  The complex transition logic used by a DFA-based matcher to ensure 
that there is only one active state requires more circuit area and a longer cycle time.  As 
pointed out by Moscola, Lockwood, et. al. [12], a DFA-based matcher has an advantage 
over an NFA-based matcher for applications that require the match state to be saved and 
reloaded since a single active state can be encoded more efficiently than multiple active 
states.  Having multiple active states is undesirable in software because each state must 
be evaluated serially, increasing processing time.  However, multiple active states are not 
a problem in an FPGA because all states can be evaluated in parallel without an increase 
in processing time. 
An NFA and a corresponding circuit can be constructed for an arbitrarily large regu-
lar expression by recursively breaking the expression into sub-expressions and applying 
some simple rules.  Figure 4 shows the corresponding NFA and circuit for each of the 
standard regular expression building blocks: 
(a) This NFA will accept the character ‘c’.  The circuit output will be one, if and 
only if the character comparator output is one and the flip-flop output is one. 
(b) This NFA and circuit will match a string containing either of the regular ex-
pressions r1 or r2.  Ni represents the NFA or circuit to implement ri. 
(c) This NFA and circuit will match a string containing r1 followed by r2. 
(d) This NFA and circuit will match a string containing zero or more occurrences 
of r1. 
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Figure 5 shows how these components can be combined to build an NFA and circuit for 
the expression ((a|b)*)(cd), which will match a string containing any sequence of zero or 
more ‘a’ or ‘b’ characters followed by the characters ‘cd’. 
One study [13] demonstrated the feasibility of using an NFA for NIDS pattern match-
ing.  They combined patterns from different rules in a subset of the Snort rule database 
into a single regular expression and then used the approach described above to generate 
an NFA pattern matching circuit.  An interesting contribution of this work was the dis-
covery that patterns with common prefixes cause duplicate circuitry to be generated, and 
that eliminating the duplicates and sharing a single copy of the circuit allows more pat-
terns to be stored in the FPGA.  One drawback of this implementation is that is was not 
possible to determine which Snort rule was associated with a match since the patterns 
were combined into a single regular expression.  Also, the performance of the design de-
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Despite improvements in software pattern matching algorithms such as those dis-
cussed in Section 1.2, content pattern matching is still the most computationally-intensive 
task of a signature-based IDS.  Therefore, in most systems, the overall packet-processing 
rate of an IDS is directly determined by the time spent in the pattern matching routine for 
each packet.  Often, many rules must be disabled to allow the IDS to keep up with the 
network line speed, which reduces its effectiveness since potential attacks might be 
missed.  With network speeds continually increasing and new attack signatures being 
created daily, IDS pattern matching performance is becoming even more critical. 
The proposed solution to the pattern matching performance problem presented in this 
research is to offload the pattern matching task to an FPGA co-processor.  An FPGA is 
well-suited for highly-regular pattern matching operations and can easily outperform a 
high-end general-purpose CPU running a software pattern matching algorithm, while al-
lowing the CPU to execute other operations in parallel with the pattern matching. 
Depending on the circuit design implemented, a single modern FPGA has enough 
logic to implement hundreds to thousands of individual pattern matching circuits all op-
erating simultaneously.  The amount of parallelism available in an FPGA makes the de-
sign of an optimal pattern matching algorithm for an FPGA inherently different than that 
of an optimal algorithm for a sequential CPU.  In an FPGA design, it is desirable to 
minimize the amount of control logic because this enables a higher-throughput data path.  
An algorithm that simply shifts the pattern by one is often faster than an algorithm that 
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uses a complex function to determine the shift amount, even though the latter requires 
less comparison operations. 
There are some existing FPGA pattern matching designs that support simple regular 
expressions and some for domain-specific applications (e.g., searching DNA databases), 
but there are no designs that support all the requirements of pattern matching for network 
intrusion detection as described in Section 1.1.  This research focuses on the design of 
efficient, high-speed pattern matching circuits capable of supporting the complex patterns 
found in network intrusion detection applications. 
2.2 The HardIDS Project 
This research is part of a project at Georgia Tech known as the Hardware IDS, or 
HardIDS, project.  The goal of this project is to design and develop a complete network 
intrusion detection system implemented using embedded hardware components consist-
ing of network processors and FPGAs.  A prototype of the HardIDS system is being de-
veloped using commercial off-the-shelf components consisting of an Intel IXP1200 net-
work processor and Xilinx Virtex and Virtex2 FPGAs.  The IXP1200 contains a  
StrongARM CPU core, which runs an embedded Linux operating system and a modified 
version of the open-source IDS software, Snort [14].  The IXP1200 also contains six 
packet processing engines, or microengines, which perform many low-level operations on 
packets before they are passed to Snort.  The FPGA operates on packets in parallel with 
the IXP1200 and sends information to Snort for analysis.  This research includes integrat-
ing the FPGA-based pattern matcher with this system. 
The flow of data through the various components of the intrusion detection system is 
shown in Figure 6.  The flow starts with Ethernet packets entering the microengines from 
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the network ports.  If a packet is part of a fragmented IP datagram, it is buffered until the 
full IP datagram can be reassembled.  The next stage is packet header matching, in which 
various header fields are checked to determine whether further analysis needs to be per-
formed.  At this point, packets for some protocols are sent to a TCP stream tracking and 
reassembly module, and others are sent to the FPGA pattern-matcher.  The stream-
processing module performs protocol-specific processing on the data, and determines 
when to send the data to the pattern-matcher.  The FPGA searches incoming packets and 
chunks of streams for all of its stored patterns and sends the rule match results to the 




Figure 6: HardIDS data flow 
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3 IMPLEMENTATION 
This section presents the design and implementation of a fully-featured FPGA pattern 
matching processor for network intrusion detection systems.  The key capabilities of the 
pattern matcher include high pattern character capacity, high throughput, and support for 
complex pattern specifications. 
3.1 Efficient Circuit Design 
The primary pattern matching circuit design used in this research builds on the NFA 
design introduced by Sidhu and Prasanna in [11] and described in Section 1.3.3.  A cir-
cuit that implements an NFA for pattern matching consists of a pipeline of character 
match units that processes one input character in each clock cycle.  A character match 
unit consists of a match function and one bit of memory storage.  The match function 
evaluates to true if the current input character matches a preprogrammed character code.  
The storage element is a flip-flop that stores the value of the previous unit’s output (the 
current match state).  The output of a character match unit (the next match state) is de-
termined by the logical AND of the match function output and the flip-flop’s output.  On 
a typical FPGA that uses look-up tables (LUTs) to implement logic functions, one way to 
implement the match function is by performing an 8-bit comparison using two 4-input 
LUTs and an AND function.  Figure 7 illustrates this technique for the character “a”.  
Each LUT takes four bits of the 8-bit value of the current character as input and produces 
a high output if the input matches the programmed character’s value.  The two LUT out-
put values are used as inputs to an AND gate whose output becomes the output of the 
match function.  Using this approach, one character match unit requires two logic ele-
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ments, where a logic element is defined as one 4-input LUT and a flip-flop.  The mapping 
of this type of character match unit to two Xilinx Virtex logic elements is shown in [13].  
This thesis demonstrates a novel optimization that allows a character match unit to fit into 
a single logic element. 
The key observation leading to the reduction in the area of a character match unit is 
that a full 8-bit comparison does not need to be performed by each unit.  In fact, with a 
pattern set containing several thousand characters it is likely that there will be hundreds 
of identical 8-bit comparisons performed.  These redundant comparisons waste valuable 
logic and routing resources and can be eliminated.  To make a match decision, each char-
acter match unit only needs a single bit of information—whether or not the input charac-
ter matches the unit’s programmed target character.  Rather than performing distributed 
comparisons in each unit to obtain this bit of information, it is more efficient to perform 
all possible comparisons once in a centralized location and send the results to each unit.  
Adapted from [11] 
Figure 7: Match function for the character “a” (0110 0001) 
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For 8-bit characters, this can be achieved by using a shared 8-to-256 decoder and con-
necting the appropriate one-bit output of the decoder to each unit.  By sharing the charac-
ter comparison results in this way, it is possible to fit a character match unit into one logic 
element.  Compared to the highest-capacity design found in previous works [13], the 
shared decoder approach doubles the maximum pattern capacity of a given reconfigur-
able logic device.  Figure 8 shows the differences between the two designs for the pattern 
‘snort’. 
In addition to using less logic resources, the shared decoder approach uses routing re-
sources more efficiently.  If C is the number of character match units, the distributed 
comparators approach requires a total of 8*C connections from the input character to the 
character match units, while the shared decoder approach only requires C connections.  
Since C increases as the number of patterns is increased and since the character match 
 
Distributed Comparators Approach 
 
 
Shared Decoder Approach 
Figure 8: Comparison of NFA design approaches 
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distribution is in the critical path, the number of routing connections affects the capac-
ity/cycle-time tradeoff.  The operating frequency of an FPGA design is determined by 
how well the place-and-route software can connect logic blocks using a limited number 
of wires.  In densely-packed designs with a large number of connections, congestion 
forces longer routes to be used for some connections.  Thus, the shared decoder approach 
with eight-times fewer connections scales much better, achieving a higher operating fre-
quency for a given capacity. 
A block diagram showing the data path of the complete shared decoder pattern 
matching module is shown in Figure 9.  The design is pipelined to process one character 
per clock cycle.  An input buffer reads incoming 32-bit data words and serializes the 
bytes to output 8-bit characters.  Next, the current character is decoded and match signals 
are distributed to the individual pattern matching units.  Each pattern matching unit has 
an output that signals when a match is detected.  For rules with multiple patterns, all of 
the corresponding pattern match outputs are passed through an AND gate to generate a 
rule match output.  The rule match signals for all N rules are stored in a match vector.  
After the last character of a packet is processed, the output encoder packs the match re-
sults into 32-bit words and sends them to the NIDS analysis engine. 
 
Figure 9: Data path of the FPGA pattern matching processor 
28 
3.2 High-Throughput Circuit Design 
The previous section introduced optimizations to NFA pattern matching circuit design 
techniques and showed how they improve the density and throughput of designs that 
process one input character per cycle.  In this section, the optimizations are extended to 
improve the efficiency of high-throughput circuits that process multiple input characters 
per clock cycle.   
Figure 10 shows the implementation of a circuit using the shared decoder technique 
to process four input characters per clock cycle.  The design requires four character de-
coders (not shown in the figure), each decoding a different input character.  A wire label 
of the form ci represents the match signal output of the ith decoder associated with the 
character code c.  Each of the rows in the circuit is an NFA that matches the target pattern 
starting at one of the four possible offsets.  The columns of flip-flops are pipeline regis-
ters.  The OR of the match signal outputs from all rows represents the match signal for 
the target pattern.   
In general, each FPGA logic element (LE) in a circuit using the shared decoder de-
sign can implement up to a four-input gate and a flip-flop, so a single LE can match from 
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A similar circuit could be implemented based on the distributed comparator approach.  
As mentioned in Section 3.1, two LEs are required to implement each character compari-
son with this technique.  Therefore, the number of LEs used for i comparisons is 2i, and 
the number used in each stage of i offsets is 2i2.  Based on these equations, the character 
decoder approach uses 8 times fewer LEs for circuits that process more than one charac-
ter per cycle.  It also requires 8 times fewer routing connections.  The character decoder 
design has in ⋅  connections, while the distributed comparator design has in ⋅8  connec-
tions.   
Figure 10: Four-way parallel decoder NFA circuit for pattern “snort” 
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3.3 Support for Complex Patterns 
This section discusses some extensions to NFA notation and the corresponding circuit 
representations that allow for more complex regular expressions to be represented effi-
ciently in reconfigurable logic.  The implementation of these extensions allows the FPGA 
design to support all the pattern matching options of the Snort rule language [15]. 
3.3.1 Case Insensitivity 
The case-sensitivity of comparisons is important for intrusion detection.  For case-
insensitive network applications, it is crucial that the NIDS analyze patterns in the same 
way to prevent the evasion technique of using non-standard capitalization.  Case-
sensitivity can also be used to help avoid false positives.  The Snort nocase rule option 
indicates that a pattern should be matched using case-insensitive comparisons; if it is not 
present in a rule, then case-sensitive comparisons are performed.   
A case-insensitive character comparison can be achieved by performing two compari-
sons—one for the lower case character and one for the upper case character.  In logic, this 
would translate into two character match units with their outputs routed into an OR func-
tion to generate the case-insensitive match signal.  However, there is a more efficient 
method that accomplishes a case-insensitive comparison using a single character match 
unit.  This technique takes advantage of the fact that the upper-case and lower-case 
ASCII codes for each letter differ by only one binary digit.  Using the distributed com-
parator approach, a case-insensitive comparison can be implemented by having two one 
values in the LUT for the high-order bits of the character.  Using the shared decoder ap-
proach, a case-insensitive comparison is implemented by taking the OR of the match sig-
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nals for the lower-case and upper-case characters as the current match input.  With either 
approach, resources are saved by eliminating the need for a second character match unit. 
3.3.2 Bounded-length Wildcards   
The use of bounded-length wildcards allows ordering and spacing information to be 
specified for multiple sub-patterns within an attack.  This makes it possible for a single 
rule to detect multiple variations of a well-documented attack by instructing the NIDS to 
look for the invariant parts of an attack while ignoring other parts of the data.  Another 
potential benefit is a reduction in false positives by restricting the searching to a sub-
section of a packet based on knowledge of the application protocol.   
In the Snort language, the offset and depth rule options are used to specify a 
search region (a range of allowable pattern positions) relative to the beginning of a packet.  
Figure 11 illustrates the usage of these options.  The distance and within rule op-
tions are functionally identical, but their values are specified relative to the end of the 
previous pattern in the rule.  A wildcard sequence with a lower-bounded length is used to 
implement offset and distance, while a sequence with an upper-bounded length is 
used to implement depth and within. 
 
 
Regular expression for pattern: 
(*≥offset)(*≤(depth–m))(P0 P1 … Pm-1) 
Figure 11: Use of position rule options 
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Earlier work has shown how to implement wildcards for zero or more characters [11] 
and zero or one characters [13] using NFA circuits.  This section shows how to imple-
ment wildcards whose lengths are specified by an arbitrary lower bound or upper bound.  
First, some notation must be introduced.  In regular expressions, (*≥ n) is used to denote 
any character sequence with a minimum length of n characters and (*≤ n) is used to denote 
any character sequence with a maximum length of n.  In NFA transition diagrams ε* is 
used to represent a character that matches the same characters as ε, but whose transition 
cannot be eliminated in the conversion to logic, and ¬(c) is used to label a transition that 
is taken for any character other than the character c.  Examples of NFAs using this nota-









Figure 12: Wildcard with lower-bounded length 
(a) NFA and (b) circuit representation of the regular expression (*≥ 3)(a) 
 
Figure 13: Wildcard with upper-bounded length 
(a) NFA and (b) circuit representation of the regular expression (a)(*≤ 2)(b)
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3.4 Approximate Pattern Matching 
Sometimes it is desirable to allow a small amount of mismatching in the pattern 
matching process.  This is useful for detecting an attack pattern that is expected to contain 
some variable content, but the exact variations are unknown or too numerous to list.  It 
can also help detect new exploits that are similar to known exploits.  Regular expressions 
with bounded-length wildcards and approximate matching are complementary techniques; 
the former is applicable to patterns with predictable variation, while the latter is suitable 
for patterns with more uncertainty. 
Formally, approximate matching is known as the k-differences problem.  Given a pat-
tern P of length m and a text string T of length n, the task is to find any character se-
quence in T that differs from P by at most k characters. This problem has been studied in 
various contexts, including the development of a bit-parallel simulation of an NFA in [16] 
and its adaptation to a misuse detection system for a multi-user computer in [17]. 
This thesis presents an NFA circuit capable of detecting approximate matches where 
the data may contain character substitutions, insertions, or deletions.  Figure 14 depicts an 
NFA for the pattern “abcd” allowing two or less differences.  The notation used is based 
on that in [16].  The NFA has (m+1)(k+1) states named using ordered pairs of the form 
(i,j), where i∈[0,k] and j∈[0,m].  State (0,0) is the initial state and there are k+1 final 
states: (0,m), (1,m) … (k,m).  Transitions between states are labeled with the character 
that enables them.  Unlabeled transitions are enabled for any character in the alphabet.  
As drawn in Figure 14, horizontal transitions indicate character matches, vertical ones are 
character insertions, solid diagonals represent character substitutions, and dashed diago-
nals are used for character deletions. 
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Figure 15 shows how the NFA in Figure 14 is implemented in a circuit.  Notation 
similar to the NFA is used to illustrate the different types of transitions—thin lines for 
insertions, bold lines for substitutions, and dashed lines for deletions.  Notice that the 
states in the column for j=0 do not need to be implemented.  State (0,0) is not stored be-
cause it is always equal to the value of  input to the NFA.  The other states in the column 
can only be reached by insertions before the first character.  In NIDS pattern matching, 
by default, any number of characters may occur before the start of the pattern.  Therefore, 
these characters are not considered insertions and the associated states can be ignored. 
 
Figure 14: NFA for “abcd” with k ≤ 2 
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The circuit has k+1 outputs corresponding to the final states of the NFA.  It is possi-
ble for multiple outputs to signal a match, but only the closest match result should be 
saved.  This is achieved by routing the outputs through a priority encoder with the signal 
for k=0 given the highest priority.  The encoded k value is returned to the NIDS analysis 
engine with the rest of the match results. 
A simple analysis of the state diagram in Figure 14 shows its complexity to be 
O(k(m+1)).  In other words, increasing k by one increases the total number of states by 
m+1.  Similarly, the circuit area scaling factor is O(km). 
3.5 Protocol Analysis 
Many ASCII-based Internet protocols (e.g. HTTP, FTP, SMTP) use a similar format.  
The basic structure consists of a command, followed by whitespace, then followed by one 
or more arguments, and finally terminated with a newline character.  The efficiency and 
Figure 15: Circuit for “abcd” with k ≤ 2 
37 
robustness of a NIDS can be improved by decoding this format and analyzing different 
portions independently.  A good example of this is found in the processing of HTTP re-
quests.  The command portion of the request, in which most attacks are found, may con-
tain a couple hundred bytes, while the data portion, which is usually benign, may be sev-
eral thousand bytes long.  By constraining pattern matching to only the command portion, 
the NIDS can increase throughput while eliminating false alarms for data that looks like 
attacks.  This functionality is implemented in the Snort rule language with the  
uricontent option.  The Universal Resource Indicator (URI) portion of the HTTP 
header occurs after a method command and is followed by the HTTP version: 
<method> <URI> <HTTP-version> 
 
The pattern-matcher decodes the header line by looking for all of the possible method 
patterns followed by any number of whitespace characters.  After a method match is 
found, all the pattern matchers for uricontent patterns are enabled.  These pattern 
matchers are subsequently disabled whenever the next white space character is reached.  
The same structure can also be used to detect buffer overflow attempts by generating an 
alert whenever the length of an argument exceeds the allowable size.  This design is 
shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16: Protocol analysis 
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3.6 Automated Circuit Generation 
Software has been developed that translates a Snort rule file into a circuit description 
for matching its content strings following all the semantics of the rule options.  The tool 
is written in Java and consists of two main components—a rule file parser and a circuit 
generator.  The parser converts Snort rules into an internal representation that is used as 
input to the circuit generator.  The circuit generator uses the Java Hardware Description 
Language (JHDL) [18] to specify FPGA circuit components and connect them to imple-
ment the pattern matchers.  Several circuit generators have been written that use different 
algorithms for designing circuits. 
3.7 System Integration 
Integrating the FPGA pattern matcher with the HardIDS system described in Section 
2.2 required modifications to some existing components as well as the development of 
new hardware and software components.  The details of the work are discussed here. 
Since the FPGA and IXP are physically located on different boards, all communica-
tion must take place over the PCI system bus.  Shared data is stored in single-ported 
SRAM on the FPGA board, which means that synchronization using locking operations 
is required.  There are four SRAM banks that can be independently locked by either the 
FPGA or the IXP. 
The communication between the FPGA and the IXP consists of two main actions—
the IXP sending packets to the FPGA and the FPGA sending match results to the IXP.  
The data transfers in the IXP to FPGA direction (downstream) are much larger than those 
in the FPGA to IXP direction (upstream).  Therefore, two SRAM banks are used for 
downstream data and one bank is used for upstream data.  The FPGA and IXP coordinate 
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locking the downstream banks so that the FPGA can read packets from one bank while 
the IXP writes packets to the other bank. 
Software has been developed for the IXP StrongARM to lock an SRAM bank on the 
FPGA and write data into the bank using direct memory access (DMA) transfers.  FPGA 
circuit modules have been developed to lock a downstream SRAM bank, read packets 
from the bank into an on-chip buffer, send a character stream through the pattern match-
ing modules, and write the match results into the upstream SRAM bank.  Finally, soft-
ware has been developed for the StrongARM to read the FPGA match results from the 
upstream bank. 
The Snort software running on the StrongARM has been modified to use the FPGA’s 
pattern matching results instead of running Snort’s pattern matching algorithm.  Changes 
have been made to the Snort detection engine to combine the RTN matches from the mi-
croengines with the pattern matches from the FPGA.  For each matching RTN, the OTN 
list is traversed and the rule options are checked like normal.  Whenever a content option 




4.1 Comparison of Circuit Design Approaches 
To provide a basis for comparing different pattern matching circuit design approaches, 
several circuit generators were developed and tested.  One circuit generator was designed 
to use the brute-force algorithm.  Two circuit generators were developed that produce 
NFA circuits using an algorithm based on distributed characters similar to that described 
in [13] and Section 1.3.3.  The produced circuits differ from the referenced design in that 
they have a match signal output for each rule.  The first distributed comparator generator 
implements a full pattern comparator for each pattern, while the second generator uses a 
prefix tree to reduce redundant circuitry for patterns with common prefixes.  Also, three 
circuit generators were implemented that produce NFA circuits based on the shared de-
coder approach developed in this work.  The first generator creates a full pattern com-
parator for each pattern, the second combines patterns using a prefix tree, and the third 
uses a prefix tree and supports the bounded wildcard options.  Finally, a parallel decoder 
NFA circuit generator was developed that matches four characters per clock cycle. 
All of the different designs were tested to determine their FPGA logic resource usage 
and supported clock rate.  Every design performed both case-sensitive and case-
insensitive comparisons as indicated by the Snort rules.  The circuits were pipelined to 
process at least one input character every clock cycle.  Each of the designs was tested 
with various-sized sets of rules from the Snort 2.0 rule database.  The set with all of the 
default rules provided in the software distribution contained 17,537 characters.  For all 
tests, the JHDL tools were used for synthesis, and the Xilinx Foundation tools were used 
for mapping, placement, and routing.   
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4.1.1 Capacity Scalability 
Tests were performed to determine the relative capacity scalability of all the design 
approaches that process a single character per clock cycle.  The test platform used was a 
Xilinx Virtex-1000 FPGA, which is a one-million-gate equivalent chip.  The same com-
pilation parameters were used for every experiment, and included a target clock rate of 
100 MHz, which is the maximum frequency supported by the FPGA platform.  The de-
signs were verified to produce correct output when running on the hardware. 
The speed and area results for the designs are presented in Table 1.  The numbers 
show that all of the designs except the distributed comparators with prefix tree met the 
speed goal of 100 MHz as long as the logic element usage was less than 95 percent.  The 
reason that this design could not achieve high clock speeds is that the prefix tree intro-
duces multiple levels of high fan-out match signals, which place more demand on the 
limited routing resources that must be shared with the character broadcast signals.  The 
prefix tree does not limit the speed of the shared decoder design because there are plenty 
of routing resources available due to the more efficient implementation of the character 
match units. 
The distinguishing property between the designs is their character capacity, which 
varies significantly among the approaches.  This is clearly illustrated in Figure 17, which 
plots the logic element usage against the number of pattern characters.  All of the designs 
have approximately linear increases in logic usage as the number of characters is in-
creased.  The important message portrayed by the graph is the relative slopes of the lines, 
which indicate the scalability of the designs.  The use of a prefix tree improves efficiency 
somewhat due to the elimination of duplicate logic, but it is apparent that the use of a 
shared character decoder is the key to providing the scalability necessary to achieve ma-
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jor gains in capacity.  Another point indicated by the graph is that support for wildcard 
options adds a constant overhead to the shared decoder with prefix tree implementation.   
The throughput of a design is calculated by multiplying the clock frequency by the 
data width (8-bits).  For a design running at 100 MHz, the throughput is 800 Mb/s.  The 
latency for each data packet is a determined by a fixed overhead and the size of the 
packet (n).  For each packet, there is a 21-cycle setup time, an n-cycle match time, and a 
39-cycle output time.  For a design running at 100 MHz, the latency is 1.2 µs for a 64-
byte packet and 15.6 µs for a 1500-byte packet.  However, due to the pipelined design, 
the output overhead can be hidden with a sequence of packets because the input process-
ing for a packet can begin as soon as the matching stage for the previous packet is com-
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Figure 17: Capacity comparison of different design approaches (Virtex-1000) 
Table 1: Speed and area comparison of different design approaches (Virtex-1000) 
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2,001 >100% - 39% 100.8 30% 83.3 16% 100.6 17% 101.7 20% 100.4 
4,012 - - 75% 100.9 52% 73.9 30% 101.4 25% 102.1 38% 100.3 
7,996 - - - - 99% 67.1 52% 100.6 42% 101.1 54% 100.1 
17,537 - - - - - - 99% 82.3 80% 100.1 96% 76.9 
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4.1.2 Throughput Scalability 
With the availability of FPGA devices with more available logic resources than are 
needed to implement a full set of rules, it is interesting to explore the tradeoffs associated 
with processing multiple input characters simultaneously at the expense of increasing the 
amount of logic required for each pattern matcher.  To demonstrate the throughput scal-
ability of the character decoder design, tests were performed using a Xilinx Virtex2-6000 
FPGA.  Circuits were generated for processing one character per clock cycle and four 
characters per clock cycle.  Table 2 presents the area and throughput results from these 
tests.  A comparison of the numbers for the two designs indicates that increasing the input 
width from one to four characters results in approximately a four times increase in area 
and throughput.  This linear scalability is expected to continue for larger input widths, 





Table 2: Area and throughput for different input widths (Virtex2-6000) 















2,001 5% 250.2 2002 17% 234.1 7491 
4,012 8% 246.4 1971 28% 207.8 6650 
7,996 14% 227.6 1821 44% 200.8 6426 
17,537 28% 192.0 1536 81% 189.9 6077 
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4.2 Comparison with Previous Work 
This section compares the results of this research with the results of previous work on 
FPGA pattern matchers for network security applications.  The chosen bodies of work 
represent the highest-performing implementations of each algorithmic approach—brute-
force, DFA, distributed comparator NFA, and shared decoder NFA.  The metrics used for 
comparison are throughput and capacity.  The throughput (in Megabits per second) of a 
design is calculated by multiplying the amount of input data (in bits) processed per cycle 
by the maximum clock frequency (in Megahertz).  The capacity of a design is the number 
of characters that can be programmed into a given FPGA device.  For comparison pur-
poses, a device-neutral metric called logic elements per character (LEs/char) is used.  
This figure is determined by dividing the total number of logic elements used in a design 
(including the input and output circuitry) by the sum of the lengths of all patterns pro-
grammed into the design.  A logic element is the fundamental unit of FPGA logic and 
consists of a four-input look-up table and a flip-flop.  Since throughput and capacity gen-
erally have an inverse relationship, any comparison of designs must consider both metrics.  
Here, a value called Performance is defined as throughput times density.  Density is the 
character density, or the reciprocal of LEs/char.  Performance increases as throughput 
and density increase and decreases as throughput and density decrease.  Therefore, a de-
sign with higher Performance provides a better tradeoff between throughput and area, or, 
in other words, a smaller increase in area as throughput is increased. 
Table 3 presents a comparison summary of previous work with this work.  The results 
show that the character decoder circuits have the best Performance for both 8-bit and 32-












(Mbps) LEs Chars LEs/char Performance
                  
Cho, Navab,  
Mangione-Smith [9] 32 Altera EP20K 90.0 2,880 17,000 1,611 10.6 272.9
      
32 Virtex-1000 171.0 5,472 8,132 489 16.6 328.9









32 Virtex2-6000 252.0 8,064 47,686 2,457 19.4 415.5
      





et. al. [12] 32 VirtexE-2000 37.0 1,184 8,134 420 19.4 61.1
      
8 Virtex-1000 30.9 247 20,618 8,003 2.6 96.0
8 VirtexE-2000 52.5 420 20,618 8,003 2.6 163.0 
Franklin, Carver, 
Hutchings [13] 
8 VirtexE-2000 49.5 396 40,232 16,028 2.5 157.8
      
8 Virtex-1000 100.1 801 19,698 17,537 1.1 712.9
























4.3 Complexity of Approximate Matching 
The logic complexity of approximate matching circuits was measured experimentally.  
Three sets of Snort rules containing approximately 2000, 4000, and 8000 characters were 
used.  For each set, a test was run with approximate matching applied to all the patterns 
for the following values of k: 0, 1, 2, and 4.  The results are shown in Figure 18.  The 
dashed lines show the theoretically-predicted values.  As expected, the design scales near 
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